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Incentive-based Approaches for Mitigating Greenhouse Gas Emissions:
Issues and Prospects for India
Shreekant Gupta†
Abstract
As a consequence of the flexibility mechanisms incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol, incentive-based
policies such as emissions trading and the clean development mechanism are being widely discussed
in the context of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement. This paper examines various issues related to
incentive-based approaches for India. Some of the specific questions it addresses are: does India stand
to gain or lose if emissions trading is realised even if it remains outside such an arrangement? Are
there any other incentive-based approaches, e.g., carbon taxes that India could adopt? In the ultimate
analysis, however, market-based instruments (MBIs) for GHG abatement in India cannot be viewed in
isolation from an overall incentive-based orientation towards environmental policy as well as broader
economic and legal reform that creates a suitable milieu for MBIs. Therefore, the paper goes on to
examine problems of implementing MBIs in general, particularly those related to monitoring
of emissions and of enforcement. Several specific solutions are also proposed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
As a consequence of the flexibility mechanisms incorporated in the Kyoto Protocol, incentive-
based policies such as emissions trading and the clean development mechanism (CDM) are being
widely discussed in the context of greenhouse gas (GHG) abatement. Whether developing
countries such as India will ratify the Protocol or not and whether they will eventually take part
in a global emissions trading system is something that will only become clear as time passes. It is
clear, however, that in either case these countries will be affected by any global architecture for
GHG abatement that emerges.
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2It is therefore important that the issues surrounding the use of incentive-based approaches
such as emissions trading are clearly understood and their implications for India are spelt out.
Some of the specific questions that arise are: does India stand to gain or lose if emissions trading
becomes a reality even if it remains outside such an arrangement? What are the terms under
which it would be advantageous for India to take part in such trading? Are there any other
incentive-based approaches, e.g., carbon taxes that India can/should adopt, either as part of an
international collective effort or suo moto?
The following section sets the context for incentive-based approaches for addressing
environmental problems in general. It briefly describes these policies as well as the international
and national mandate for their use in the Indian context. Section 3 focuses in particular on
incentive-based policies in the context of climate change. It examines mechanisms in the short-
run such as CDM, as well as policies that could play a role in the longer-term, e.g., emissions
trading. A key issue with respect to the latter is the initial allocation of permits and the potential
gains from trade that could accrue to India. Section 4 examines domestic actions that India could
undertake to complement an international agreement on GHGs. In particular, it focuses on the
possibility of using a domestic carbon tax and its synergistic effects with a global emissions
trading regime. Section 5 reviews problems in implementing incentive-based policies such as
taxes and tradable permits in India in general and possible solutions. The final section concludes.
It should be mentioned that this paper focuses on carbon dioxide emissions and does not address
other greenhouse gases such as methane.1
2. THE CONTEXT FOR INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACHES
Economists have advocated the use of incentive-based policies (IBPs) to address
environmental problems for over three decades. This advocacy is primarily on grounds of
cost-effectiveness.2 In other words, IBPs are a more cost-effective means of achieving a given
environmental quality than alternative approaches such as direct regulation of polluters.
Essentially, IBPs work through the market system to influence the behaviour of economic
agents such as firms and households, by creating economic incentives/disincentives, which in
turn affect the pollution or other environmental impacts generated by these agents. For this
reason IBPs are more commonly referred to as market-based instruments (MBIs).3 By contrast,
the conventional approach to environmental regulation is through a set of “dos” and “don’ts”
such as mandatory emission standards, equipment or process requirements. Thus, regulators
attempt to determine both how much pollution is generated and also how it is abated.
Occasionally these measures are combined with an outright ban or prohibition of activities that
are deemed to be detrimental to the environment. This approach allows little flexibility to the
agents being regulated in complying with the regulations. Hence it is referred to as “command
and control” (CAC).
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 For an early attempt to address the issue of other GHGs using a multi-gas framework see Reilly et al. (1999).
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 A policy is cost-effective if it achieves its objective at least-cost compared to alternative policies.
3
 A variety of terms has been used to describe MBIs. Some of these are “economic incentives,” “economic
instruments,” “economic approaches,” “market-oriented approaches,” “market-based incentives,” and “incentive
mechanisms.”
3MBIs can be broadly classified in two groups: price-based instruments and quantity-based
instruments. While all of these instruments can be used to address a wide range of environmental
problems, they are discussed below primarily in terms of their application to greenhouse gas
(GHG) abatement. Within the first group, one can further differentiate between direct and
indirect price-based instruments. The former induce generators of pollution to reduce pollution
by charging for the use environmental resources, e.g., air and water. Indirect price-based
instruments on the other hand, increase (decrease) the prices of outputs and inputs that are
complementary (substitutes) to the polluting activity. For example, a tax on petrol (or a subsidy
to mass transit) is an indirect price-based instrument to address vehicular air pollution.4
Quantity-based instruments create transferable/saleable rights for the use of environmental
resources such as air and water, which are assigned/sold/auctioned to polluters. The major
instrument in this category is marketable permits.5 Under this approach, a target level of
environmental quality is translated into the total amount of allowable emissions/effluent that can
be discharged. The regulator then allots/sells/auctions the right to discharge in the form of permits
which can be bought and sold (i.e., traded), subject to an overall ceiling of allowable discharges
which has been fixed a priori. Given that this ceiling is less than the current aggregate level of
discharges, there is a scarcity value to the permits and this puts an initial price on them. This price
would increase over time as economic activity increases and more agents bid for the permits.6
In fact, Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol specifically allows emissions trading among Annex B
(mainly industrialised) countries as a means of fulfilling their commitment to reduce GHG
emissions.7 As mentioned earlier, this proposal has attracted a huge amount of attention from
economists, policy makers and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). It is also possible that a
global emission trading system may emerge in the long run that includes all nations and not
simply the industrialised ones. Emission trading is discussed in greater detail in Section 3 below.
Despite the longstanding advocacy by economists, it is only recently that MBIs have been
endorsed both by the international community and by the Indian government. Principle 16 of the
Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which was adopted at the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992, and to which India is a signatory, states:
National authorities should endeavour to promote the internalisation of environmental
costs and the use of economic instruments, taking into account the approach that the
polluter should, in principle, bear the cost of pollution, with due regard to the public
interest and without distorting international trade and investment.
The action programme to implement this declaration (better known as Agenda 21) which has
been adopted by more than 178 nations including India, also reiterates this principle. In Chapter 8
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 From this example it will be clear that the effectiveness of indirect instruments crucially depends on the strength of
the linkage between the transactions to which it is applied and the environmental problem that the instrument
seeks to address.
5
 Also known as tradable permits, tradable pollution permits, transferable permits, emissions permits, emissions
trading or pollution licenses.
6
 It is important to note two additional aspects of tradable permits. Firstly, tradable permits are not a “license to
pollute,” as is sometimes argued: while purchase of permits does allow the buyer to discharge more, this is
matched by an equal reduction by another agent which has sold the permit, and thus forfeited its right to
discharge by that amount. Secondly, if permits are designed so that they expire annually (or every few years) and
have to be repurchased, the regulator can even tighten ambient environmental standards over time by reducing
the amount of permits it sells each time.
7
 This is sometimes also referred to as “cap and trade” since emission limits or quotas are allocated to Annex B
countries which can then be traded.
4it states “environmental law and regulation are important but cannot alone be expected to deal
with the problems of environment and development. Prices, markets and governmental fiscal and
economic policies also play a complementary role in shaping attitudes and behaviour towards the
environment” (para 8.27, emphasis added). The document goes on to cite the increasing use of
economic approaches not only in industrialised countries but also in Central and Eastern Europe
and in developing countries. It further states “within a supportive international and national
economic context and given the necessary legal and regulatory framework, economic and market-
oriented approaches can in many cases enhance capacity to deal with the issues of environment
and development” (para 8.29).8 Finally, Agenda 21 also calls for more effective and widespread
use of economic and market-oriented approaches to reinforce the synergy between environment
and development.
A few months before the Rio conference in 1992 the Government of India also came out with
a Policy Statement for Abatement of Pollution that, inter alia, declared that market-based
approaches would be considered in controlling pollution. It stated “economic instruments will be
investigated to encourage the shift from curative to preventive measures, internalise the costs of
pollution and conserve resources, particularly water” (para 7.3). In particular, effluent charges
for water pollution were singled out as an example of an economic instrument.
More recently, in 1995 the Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF) of the Government
of India constituted a task force to evaluate MBIs for industrial pollution abatement. The task
force submitted its report in January 1997. It recommended that MBIs such as taxes and permits
be introduced at least on a pilot basis. There have been a number of government-sponsored
workshops and meetings on MBIs since then and there are indications that some such
instruments may be introduced in the near future.9
In sum, the underlying principle of MBIs (not specifically in the context of climate change)
has been cautiously endorsed by the international community as well as by the Indian
government. As we see below, however, there are still a number of misgivings about MBIs both
in the context of GHG abatement and for overall environmental protection.10
3. INCENTIVE-BASED APPROACHES FOR CLIMATE CHANGE: Short-Run and
Long-Run Issues
In the context of India, the clean development mechanism (CDM) proposed under Article 12
of the Kyoto Protocol is the only policy that approximates an incentive-based approach in the
short-run (that is, during the ‘first’ commitment period 2008-2012).11 In the long-run (beyond
2012), India might participate in GHG abatement through IBPs such as emissions trading. This,
of course, would depend on a number of factors such as whether India accepted a cap on GHG
emissions, how the permits were allocated, and so on. In this section, therefore, I examine issues
related to IBPs in the short- and long-term from India’s perspective.
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 Note the emphasis on the legal and regulatory framework as a prerequisite. I address this issue in Section 5 below.
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 Remarks to this effect were made by the Special Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF),
Government of India at the joint MoEF-USEPA workshop on “Market Mechanisms for Air Pollution Control,”
New Delhi, March 12-13, 2002.
10
 For recent surveys on the experience with MBIs (in the U.S. and internationally) see U.S. EPA (2001), Stavins
(2001a, 2001b), and Huber (1998).
11
 This is often refereed to as the ‘first’ commitment period though it is not clear as to when the next commitment
period will start and how long it will be. Thus, so far it is the only commitment period.
53.1 Looking at the Short-run: CDM as an Incentive-based Policy
CDM is the only Kyoto flexibility mechanism that explicitly attempts to engage developing
countries in international GHG abatement efforts.12 It is similar in nature to joint implementation
(JI) except that JI takes place between developed (Annex B) countries, whereas CDM refers to
cooperative agreements in which the host is a developing country (Karp and Liu, 2000).
Specifically, under CDM developed countries (or firms in those countries) fund GHG abatement
projects in developing countries where abatement costs are much lower. In turn, the developed
countries receive credits (“certified emission reductions” or CERs) that can be used to offset
their emission reduction obligations (see Toman, 2000, and Babu, 2002, for details).
There are two issues relating to CDM that are important in the context of IBPs. First, it should
be noted that CDM will be implemented on a project-by-project basis-the basic rationale for
undertaking a CDM project is the difference in marginal abatement costs (MACs) between the
host country and the Annex 1 country. However, the key feature of a market—a competitively
determined price—is missing under CDM. In a permit market even inframarginal units of
abatement are sold at the prevailing market price. Thus, in Figure 1 with maximum level of
unconstrained carbon emissions Ef, at price P* emissions reduction would EfE*, and the shaded
area to the left of Ef would be the surplus for a seller of permits from selling inframarginal units
of abatement. Similarly, a buyer of permits (not shown) would also gain from buying permits at
P*. Unlike permit markets with an observable price, division of gains from trade (the difference
between MACs) will be an important issue for CDM projects. Some researchers have suggested
that rather than receiving a competitive market price for emission reductions, developing
countries may simply be paid the actual cost of abatement, perhaps with some markup (Chander,
2002). On the other hand, Babu et al. (2002) posit that the total gains from CDM as well as the
share of developing countries will depend on their relative bargaining power vis-à-vis developed
countries. This result holds whether CDM projects take place between individual firms across
countries or through bilateral negotiations between governments.
Figure 1. Surplus for a seller of permits
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 Joint implementation (formerly AIJ) and emissions trading being the other two. For an overview of Kyoto
flexibility mechanisms see Weiner (1999).
6Thus, while a project-specific basis for defining and creating CERs under CDM does imply
bilateral transactions (betweens firms or governments), a situation where the host country is
required to accept payment at its MAC (or a small markup over it) is only one of a set of possible
outcomes. The actual outcome would depend to a considerable extent on how well CDM itself
is defined as an institution and how well market institutions (e.g., brokerage for secondary
transactions) evolve. It is for instance possible that developing countries produce CERs for their
own account and sell them at prevailing market prices into an active international exchange
system. While bilateral exchange with monopsony by rich buyers is a possibility, also eminently
possible is a situation in which a big CER supplier (like China) could act like a dominant firm
monopolist, especially if Russian “hot air” were constrained.
Though one would expect bargaining theory to shed light on this issue, unfortunately CDM
does not lend itself to easy application of bargaining theory. For instance, in several bargaining
models the outcome depends on relative bargaining power—a concept that is difficult to
operationalize. In non-cooperative bargaining in particular, the models hinge critically on the
exact bargaining protocol. It is, therefore, difficult to apply them to real world situations such as
CDM without knowledge of how actual bargaining will be implemented. Further, several of the
‘clean’ theoretical results are based on two person bargaining, as also on the assumption of no
collusion, whereas CDM will involve many players and may have coalitions (e.g., E.U. countries
might act as one). One should, however, mention here that some robust experimental regularities
have been observed in bargaining games of which a fair (50-50) division is the most prominent.13
These empirical findings are contrary to what received theory predicts and only recently have
there been attempts to develop a positive theory of the 50-50 division of the gains from trade.14
This is useful to bear in mind in the context of CDM projects.
The second issue vis-à-vis CDM as an IBP is that if developing countries were obliged to take
on emission reductions in the future, implementation of low cost abatement projects (the so-
called low hanging fruit) now would leave them with higher cost options later. As Karp and Liu
(2000), however, rightly point out the main problem with CDM is not that the most lucrative
projects would be taken up first (as they should be) but the possibility that the host country
receives inadequate compensation. The latter of course, is a function of the way CDM is set up
as argued above. Thus, if host countries could create and bank their own CERs (if they thought
the current price was too low) this would solve the problem.15 More fundamentally, the question
facing developing countries in this context is whether to cash in on CDM opportunities now or to
wait. In any event, it would perhaps be more desirable to have global emissions trading where
developing countries such as India could sell their emission reductions at a competitive market
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 Most notable is Güth et al. (1982) who studied experimentally the two-player ultimatum game and found that the
average proposal by first-movers was roughly in the neighborhood of 60-40.
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 See for instance Lopomo and Ok (2001).
15
 It is a moot point whether additional ‘low fruit’ opportunities would keep arising. This would happen only if
convergence of technologies between North and South did not occur. This (lack of convergence) seems unlikely
especially with deregulation and globalization taking place in several economies in the South particularly India
and China. Most of the old technologies in the energy intensive sectors in the South (power and transport for
example) are being replaced by state of art technologies. Therefore, it seems more plausible to view the ‘low
fruit’ as a one time opportunity.
7price. This is discussed in greater detail below. In passing, it should be noted that even if
competitive trade in emissions were not established, developing countries (other than energy
exporters) would still benefit from the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol since international
prices of fossil fuels would fall due to cuts in Annex B consumption (Babiker et al., 2000).
This would facilitate faster economic growth in developing countries (Chander, 2002).
The prospects for CDM in the near-term, however, are uncertain due to several developments
post-COP 5 (1999). These are, inter alia: (i) U.S. pullout from the Kyoto Protocol and
(ii) granting of Article 3.4 sinks.16 While the first development reduces global demand for GHG
abatement drastically, the granting of sinks (combined with Russian and Ukrainian hot air)
relaxes the abatement targets substantially. If Russia and Ukraine did not exercise market power
(e.g., cartelize), Annex B emissions in 2010 would actually increase by 9% over the 2000 level
and the carbon-equivalent price would fall to below $5 per ton C—in effect, not significantly
different from zero! 17 This is to be expected given a sharp drop in demand for abatement coupled
with a huge increase in supply (sinks and hot air). On the other hand, if Russia and Ukraine were
to cartelize in order to maximize revenue, Annex B emissions between 2000 and 2010 would
roughly remain unchanged and the carbon-equivalent price would be around $25 per ton C
(Babiker et al., 2002). In either event, despite fungibility of emission reductions under the Kyoto
flexibility mechanisms, there do not appear to be many takers for CDM in the short-run.
3.2 Looking Beyond CDM: Equity and Tradable Permits
International negotiations to decide on the architecture of GHG abatement regime beyond
2008-2012 will start in earnest by 2005. If India decided to accept a voluntary national
commitment (which is what it would need to do to participate in Article 17 emissions trading)
the basis for establishing this commitment would be vital. In addition to the widely discussed
(but unlikely) per capita criterion another possibility would be a ‘growth baseline.’18 It could also
retain the option just to participate in project-based credit trading. In the long-run, however, there
would have to be some international consensus on allocation based on equity, howsoever that
were defined. Cazorla and Toman (2000) provide a useful survey of various concepts of equity
and how these concepts could be applied in the context of climate change. According to them,
while the concept of equity can be interpreted in many ways, “any criteria that might be used to
distribute current and future burdens of GHG mitigation must be based, explicitly or otherwise,
on some concept of equity” (op. cit., p. 5, emphasis added). I return to this point later.
In the discussion below as an illustration I trace out the implications for India should it take
part in global emissions trading that meets the commitments by Annex B countries (see Table 1
for Kyoto emission reduction targets). While this relates to the scenario prior to the US pullout
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 Under the Bonn and Marrakech agreements a total of about 70 MMtc of sinks have been allowed (see Babiker et
al., 2002, for details).
17
 These results are consistent with several other studies cited by Babiker et al. (2002).
18
 This is an approach to developing country emissions commitments that would not cap emissions in absolute terms
but would require countries to increase their GHGs emissions at a slower rate than their economies. In other
words, emission intensity (the ratio of GHG emissions to gross domestic product) would decline—very much
like the Clear Skies Initiative announced by President Bush in February this year.
8Table 1. Emissions Levels Corresponding to Kyoto Commitments
USA JPN EEC OOE EET FSU
Non-
Annex B
CHN IND
Reference emissions
1990 (Mton)
1362 298 822 318 266 891 2022 833 183
Reference emissions
2010 (Mton)
1838 424 1064 472 395 763 4142 1792 486
Kyoto commitments
/ 1990
93% 94% 92% 94.5% 104% 98% NA NA NA
Emissions target in
2010 (Mton)
1267 280 756 301 273 873 4142 1792 486
Reduction/reference
emissions (Mton)
571 144 308 171 118 0 0 0 0
Reduction/reference
emissions (%)
31 34 29 36 30 0 0 0 0
“hot air” (Mton) 0 0 0 0 0 111 0 0 0
Source: Ellerman and others 1998, Table 1
Annex B regions: USA, Japan (JPN), European Union (EEC), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern Europe (EET), former Soviet
Union (FSU)
Non Annex B regions: China (CHN), India (IND), energy exporting countries (EEX), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil
(BRA), rest of world (ROW)—only selected Non-Annex B regions are shown in table.
from the Kyoto Protocol and before the developments at COP 7 at Marrakech in 2001,19 the
exercise is nevertheless useful in highlighting the potential volume of permit trading and the
resulting permit prices.
Likely prices of permits under alternative trading scenarios to implement Kyoto commitments
are estimated using the Emissions Prediction and Policy Assessment (EPPA) model developed at
MIT.20 Under full global trading, emissions trading would not be restricted to Annex B countries
(as proposed under the Kyoto Protocol) but would include countries such as India and China.21
Since the latter have many more low-cost abatement options, the market price of permits would
be much lower ($24/ton of carbon) compared to $127/ton under Annex B trading only. The gains
from trade for India and China would be about $1.5 billion and $6 billion, respectively
(Table 2). Moreover, the gains from trading worldwide would be $109 billion as compared to
$66 billion from Annex B trading only.
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 Following the Kyoto Protocol at COP 3 in 1997, a three year negotiation under the Buenos Aires Plan of Action
(on the details needed for implementation) was launched by COP 4 (at Buenos Aires) in 1998. After the election
of President George Bush in November 2000, however, the United States withdrew from the pact with Bush
calling the treaty “deeply flawed.” Other countries/groups such as E.U., Japan and Canada pushed ahead and
resumed negotiations at Bonn in July 2001 (COP 6 Part II). The so-called Marrakech Accords were agreed to at
Marrakech (COP 7) in November 2001. See Babiker et al. (2002) for details.
20
 This is a multi-sectoral, multi-regional, computable general equilibrium (CGE) model of global economic activity,
energy use and carbon emissions. The model can be used to generate MAC curves for different regions and
countries which in turn are used to analyze various emissions trading scenarios. See Ellerman et al. (1998) for
details.
21
 Though the issue of allocation of quotas to these countries is not explicitly addressed, it is assumed that their
emissions will be as in the business as usual (BAU) scenario. This is consistent with other modeling exercises of
this nature such as the MS-MRTS model and the G cubed model discussed below.
9Table 2. World Emissions Trading
USA JPN EEC OOE EET FSU World CHN IND
Reductions / ref 2010
(Mton)
182 12 73 59 52 101 1202 437 102
“hot air” (Mton) — — — — — 111 111 — —
Permits market price
($/ton)
24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Cost of abatement
($billion)
1.66 0.14 0.71 0.41 0.43 0.81 11.15 4.22 0.95
Permits exp (–) / imp (+)
(Mton)
390 132 234 112 66 –211 0 –437 –102
Flows exp (–) / imp (+)
($billion)
9.27 3.15 5.57 2.67 1.57 –5.03 0.00
–10.4
0
–2.44
Total cost ($billion) 10.94 3.29 6.29 3.09 2.01 –4.22 11.15 –6.17 –1.49
Gains from trade ($billion) 26.69 31.08 24.00 9.73 2.66 4.22 108.61 6.17 1.49
Source: Ellerman and others 1998, Table C
In this context, it is important to realise that India would not be the only player from the South
if global emissions trading to implement Kyoto were to emerge. In fact, since India’s emissions
are relatively small compared to those of China, the latter would have a much larger amount of
permits to sell. Basically, three countries would account for the bulk of exports: China (47%),
FSU (23%) and India (11%), for a total of 81% altogether (Ellerman et al., 1998). It is also
important to note that compared to projected emission levels in 2010 of about 1790 million tons
and 490 million tons for China and India, respectively, the amount of permits sold by each
country would be much less—440 and 100 million tons, respectively (Tables 1 and 2).
Several other models such as the MS-MRT model and the G-cubed model also produce
broadly similar results.22 In the MS-MRT model, under the global trading scenario, non-Annex 1
countries assume an emissions target equal to their emissions under the no trading scenario
(BAU). Similarly, in the G cubed model the allocation of permits to non-Annex 1 countries is
consistent with their baseline emissions. As with the EPPA model, permit prices are lower under
full global trading ($31 and $23 per ton, respectively) compared to restricted trading among
Annex B countries only.
More generally, an allocation based on the per capita rule would give India permits in excess
of its actual emissions much like Russian “hot air,” which would be a windfall, at least in the
short run.23 For instance, on the basis of the per capita criterion, India could potentially increase
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 The Multi-Sector Multi-Region Trade (MS-MRT) model is a dynamic, multi-region general equilibrium model
that is designed to study the effect of carbon restrictions on trade and economic welfare in different regions of
the world. Unlike EPPA, China and India are grouped as one region in the model so it is not possible to look at
their trading activity separately. See Bernstein et al. (1999) for details. The G cubed model is also a multi-sector,
multi-region intertemporal general equilibrium model of the world economy. See McKibbin et al. (1999) for
details. These models are among 13 that were used to compare the outcomes of a set of post-Kyoto scenarios in a
special issue of the Energy Journal (Weyant, 1999).
23
 Of the Annex B countries, year 2010 emissions for Russia, Ukraine and the Baltic states (principal constituents of
the former Soviet Union, FSU) are predicted to be below the aggregate level to which they committed at Kyoto.
The difference between the FSU commitment (873 Mton) and predicted emissions (763 Mton) is known as “hot
air” (111 Mton), a de facto right to emit (Ellerman et al., 1998). See also Table 1.
10
its emissions in 2010 by 722% over the 1990 level (Gupta and Bhandari, 1998, Table 6). Actual
emissions, however, may not increase even three times over the same period (Table 1).24 This
creation of Indian “hot air” may not be acceptable internationally and some compromise may be
required.25
More important, the implications of technical progress for permit prices and for alternative
allocation criteria needs to be carefully thought through—diffused technical progress of the kind
that leads to a downward shift in the marginal abatement cost (MAC) curve of developing
countries, could actually lead to a fall in revenue for permit exporting countries (Bertram, 1996).
This result is particularly true when quotas are allocated using the per capita rule that gives
developing countries such as India a large number of permits.
A downward shift in the MAC curve for developing countries has three effects which are
relevant to their gains and losses from technical progress for a given global emissions budget:
(i) abatement costs fall which frees up resources for other uses, (ii) the volume of quotas sold by
developing countries to developed countries increases, and (iii) the world price of quota falls
(Bertram, op. cit.). The first two effects represent gains for developing countries whereas the
third is a loss. The net result depends on the slopes of the MAC curves as well as the rule used to
allocate quotas.
Figure 2 (cf. Bertram, op. cit., Fig. 1) depicts MAC curves for two regions—the industrialised
North and the developing South with the global emission budget fixed as the length of the
Figure 2. Technical progress and permit prices.
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 It should be noted that in calculating per capita entitlement in year t, population is not pegged at some reference
year but is taken at the actual level that prevails in year t. Thus, India with an increasing population gains
disproportionately as compared to countries such as China that have stabilised their population. The “hot air”
that India would acquire would be less if the reference population level were fixed at year 1990 or 2000.
25
 It should also be noted that China’s emissions are projected to roughly double (from 833 Mton in 1990 to about
1800 Mton in 2010). However, under the per capita criterion it can increase its emissions by 162% over the same
period (Gupta and Bhandari, op. cit., Table 6). Thus, it does not stand to gain as much by creation of “hot air”
and may therefore be a less enthusiastic supporter of the per capita rule.
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horizontal axis. Emissions in the North emissions are measured from ON and increase to the right.
Thus, maximum unconstrained emissions for the North are ONN and its marginal abatement curve
(MACN) is drawn sloping up from N. The South’s emissions are measured from OS and increase
to the left and its marginal abatement cost is MACS. Since aggregate business-as-usual emissions
(ONN+OSS) would violate the global emission budget, under a tax or a permit system both regions
would move up their MAC curves to E with a corresponding emissions tax/permit price P*.
Technical progress, e.g., through CDM leads to a downward shift in the South’s MAC curve to
MACS´. As Bertram shows, if the North’s MAC curve is sufficiently steep over the relevant range,
then the decline in price of quotas will mean a fall in revenue of the South. For instance, the per
capita rule would allocate ONB and OSB of quotas to the North and South, respectively. In the
original situation (before technical progress) the North would abate to point E and buy BA of
quota from the South paying a sum of BDEA. After technical progress, the North would abate
less (to point G) and buy BF of quota from the South paying a sum of BKGF. Total revenue for
the South would fall since BDEA > BKGF (effectively, KDEL > ALGF).26 Further, if this fall in
revenue is greater than the reduction in the South’s abatement costs then the South will lose
overall from its own technical progress. He further shows that the slope of the North’s MAC curve
varies directly with the quota allocated to the South. In other words, with a liberal allocation rule
such as the per capita rule the South could lose revenue due to technical progress.27
4. THE ROLE AND POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMYWIDE/SECTORAL POLICIES IN
INDIA TO REDUCE GHG EMISSIONS
If India were to undertake to sell emission reductions as indicated above, how could these
reductions be achieved efficiently? Again, rather than the project-by-project approach of CDM,
it may be better to use an incentive-based approach such as a carbon tax and/or to remove energy
subsidies. These steps would not only be more transparent but would also be more broad-based
in their impact. In addition, such measures would be easily verifiable and implementable. A key
issue of how to make these measures politically implementable is addressed below.
4.1 Removal of Energy Subsidies
Strictly speaking, this is not a tax since what is essentially proposed is the elimination of a
negative tax, i.e., the subsidy.28 While one could view this as a sector-wide CDM project, there is
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 It can be easily verified that an alternate allocation rule such as OSS to the South (in effect covering the South’s
baseline emissions) would lead to less loss in revenue to the South from technical progress.
27
 “...with an exogenously set global budget allocated by the per capita rule with a consequent large redistribution of
global permanent income towards the South, inhabitants of the South would lose from technical progress
wherever in the world it takes place” (Bertram, op. cit., p. 480, emphasis added). It is important to note that as a
permit exporter the South would also be a net loser from technical progress in the North alone or from uniformly
diffused technical progress. Thus, given the possibility of technical progress it would be better for the South to
opt for a more conservative quota allocation rule such as one that covers its business-as-usual emissions—that is,
a NRFTS (no-regrets for-the-South) rule.
28
 Subsidy is defined as the difference between domestic fossil fuel prices and their (private) opportunity cost
evaluated at end-user prices. When fuels are traded internationally border prices serve as opportunity cost,
which is the case for petroleum products. In this case end-user opportunity cost would be border prices plus a
distribution markup.
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an ongoing debate about whether something like this would be eligible for CDM credit, that is,
whether it would be “additional” enough. The same issues are also likely to come up in
negotiating a national growth baseline.
It is true that these subsidies have been declining—during the first half of 1990s total fossil
fuel subsidies in 14 developing countries declined by 45%. During the same period, OECD
subsidies declined by 21% (Reid and Goldemberg, 1998). In India, with the dismantling of the
Administered Price Mechanism (APM) for petroleum products and ongoing economic reforms,
these subsidies are set to decline even further. In general, energy price reforms in developing
countries should be acknowledged as positive steps towards addressing climate change (op. cit.).
There is, however, still a long way to go—the International Energy Agency estimates that in
eight largest energy producing countries outside the OECD (China, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Kazakhstan, Russia, South Africa and Venezuela), end-use energy prices are about 20% below
their opportunity cost (Fischer and Toman, 2000). Larsen (1994) estimated world fossil fuel
(coal, natural gas and petroleum) subsidies in the range of $210-220 billion (with the former
Soviet Union accounting for more than two-thirds of the total), or 20-25% of the value of world
fossil fuel consumption. The importance of focusing on a few key countries is underscored by
the fact that 90% of the world coal is consumed by 15 countries; almost 80% of world petroleum
products by 28 countries and almost 90% of the world natural gas by 18 countries (Larsen,
1994). Further, these countries emit 85% of global carbon from fossil fuels (op. cit.).
More important, this study and an earlier one by Larsen and Shah (1992) estimates the
environmental benefits associated with the elimination of these subsidies.29 As mentioned earlier,
in determining the level of energy subsidy border prices are used as the benchmark (a surrogate
for the marginal opportunity cost of production). The subsidy is simply the ratio of the domestic
price to the world price times the domestic consumption of the fuel. Removal of these subsidies
is expected to lead to reductions in fossil fuel consumption and therefore carbon emissions. The
size of the reductions would, of course, depend on the price elasticities. The studies use a partial
equilibrium approach that assumes factor prices, other than energy prices, and the level of
aggregate output remain constant. They also assume constant price elasticity of demand for each
fossil fuel. Long-run own price elasticities of energy demand for various countries are obtained
from Bohi (1981) and other studies.
In the case of India subsidies for coal were $2.55 billion (based on a domestic price to border
price ratio of 0.62). For petroleum products the figure was $4.25 billion (based on a price ratio of
0.33 for kerosene and 0.79 for diesel) for a total energy subsidy of $6.8 billion, or 2.3% of GDP
(Larsen, 1994, Tables 2 and 5). Further, an increase in prices of these fuels would result in a
reduction in CO2 emissions by 9% in the year 2010 relative to the baseline (that is, without
removal of subsidies).30
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 The main difference between the two is that the more recent study by Larsen allows for the possibility of interfuel
substitution (between coal, petroleum and natural gas) whereas the earlier one does not.
30
 For India, the own price elasticity used for coal is 0.6 and for petroleum products it is 0.25. It should also be noted
that emissions without the subsidies do go up but not by as much—thus, emissions increase by 2.5 times over 1989
levels without subsidies compared to 2.8 times if the subsidies were not removed (Larsen, op. cit. Table 6).
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The study by Larsen and Shah (henceforth L-S) estimates the welfare gain of removing fossil
fuel subsidies in 13 non-OECD countries/regions as approximated by the Harberger triangle.31
Total welfare gains in subsidizing countries from removing fossil fuel subsidies is $33 billion,
i.e., 15% of world subsidies. As expected, welfare gains are largest for the former Soviet Union
($29.3 billion) and the welfare gain for India is $74 million. These figures could be an
underestimate for various reasons. First, as a measurement issue the Harberger triangle would
understate welfare gains because the approach uses linear approximations to nonlinear demand
and supply functions used by L-S. More important, however, these figures may significantly
understate true welfare gains if costs of local pollution and alternative uses of revenue from
subsidy removal are not taken into account.
On the other hand, however, if all countries removed these subsidies at the same time there
would be large reductions in their fossil fuel demand and a fall in world energy prices at the
same time.32 On account of the latter, energy exporting countries would lose and energy
importers would gain. Thus, welfare gains for the former Soviet Union would be reduced to
$22 billion but for India they would increase to almost $21 billion (L-S, op. cit., Table 4). For the
world as a whole (that is, including subsidizing and non-subsidizing countries) the welfare gain
would be $22.5 billion (down from $33 billion earlier).
From a practical viewpoint, removal of subsidies in developing countries such as India may
be difficult to implement politically. This is due to the fact that large constituencies have been
created (such as truckers) who benefit from these subsidies. The environmental benefits,
however, of reduced carbon emissions would be a good reason for doing so. In this context, it is
useful to note that an OECD carbon tax that would achieve the same world emission reductions
as those resulting from subsidy removal in non-OECD countries, would be quite substantial—in
the range of $50-90/ton (L-S, op. cit., Table 5). Therefore, as an alternative to (or in conjunction
with) emissions trading with countries such as India, it might be possible for OECD countries to
substitute some of their own carbon taxes by compensating non-OECD countries for removing
fossil fuel subsidies. Though removal of subsidies is welfare improving in the long run even in
the absence of this compensation, transfers from rich countries would help mitigate short run
adjustment costs and the distributional consequences (of removing subsidies) in poor countries,
and make this step more feasible. This also assumes OECD countries could get credits against
their emission reduction obligations for doing so.
A more recent study for coal-based electricity generation in India also shows that policies that
remove price distortions (namely, marginal cost pricing and elimination of subsidy to producers)
combined with freer imports of high quality coal, could reduce carbon emissions by 6.6%
(Khanna and Zilberman, 1999). Further, this reduction in carbon emissions is accompanied by an
increase in the volume of electricity generated, lower coal consumption and an increase in social
welfare by 8.6%. This reinforces the beneficial impact of the removal of trade and domestic
policy distortions on carbon abatement.
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 An important caveat is that welfare calculations are based on estimating producer and consumer surpluses of fossil
fuel production and consumption, respectively, and this assumes full employment of resources. It should
therefore be considered as a long-run approximation to welfare gain (Larsen and Shah, op. cit.).
32
 Removal of subsidies leads to a downward shift in world energy demand and results in a lower equilibrium price
and quantity (but this quantity is greater than what would have prevailed if world price effects had not been
considered).
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4.2 The Potential for Using Carbon Taxes
Though recent discussion on economic responses towards climate change has been dominated
by tradable permits, there has also been considerable work on the role of carbon taxes (see
Baranzini et al., 2000, for a recent survey). The world’s first carbon tax was introduced by
Finland in January 1990 ($6.10 per ton of carbon on all fossil fuels). Since then, five other
countries—Sweden ($45/ton), Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and most recently,
Italy—have implemented taxes based on the carbon content of energy products.33 These are
certainly the most direct price instruments to reduce carbon emissions.
An early study estimated that even a modest tax of $10/ton on the carbon content of fossil
fuels, imposed individually by all countries could raise $55 billion in the very first year of its
operation (Shah and Larsen, 1992, henceforth S-L). In this context, India’s carbon emissions
estimated at 148.2 million tons in 1990 could have yielded potential tax revenue of $1482
million.34 It is also true that carbon taxes in general are easier to administer than taxes on
personal and corporate income and thereby less prone to tax avoidance and evasion. The issue
is one of their relative efficiency and equity vis-à-vis other taxes.
S-L examine the incidence of such a carbon tax for Pakistan and conclude that under partial
forward shifting of the tax, it is roughly proportional or progressive in incidence (depending on
whether income or expenditure is taken as a base). Given that a tax on personal income is also
not necessarily progressive in developing countries (due to widespread evasion and exemption of
rural incomes) they conclude “regressivity of carbon taxes should be less of a concern in
developing countries than in developed countries” (op. cit., p. 11).
They also estimate the efficiency costs of carbon taxes for five countries including India.35
These costs are defined as the net marginal welfare cost of replacing other taxes by a carbon tax.
The two taxes considered are personal income tax and corporate income tax. With respect to the
personal income tax, a revenue neutral switch to a $10/ton carbon tax leads to a net welfare loss
in all countries studied. For India this figure is $129 million. For corporate income tax, however,
there is a net increase in welfare of $250 million for India.36
It is also of interest to consider welfare costs of carbon taxes with no change in existing taxes.
In this case L-S find that welfare costs for India are $130 million, that is, about 8.8 cents per
dollar of revenue from the carbon tax ($1482 million). In other words, welfare costs represent
only a small fraction of carbon tax revenues. It is also interesting to note that the welfare loss
($130 million) is almost the same as that in the previous case where carbon tax revenues were
recycled to reduce personal income taxes ($129 million). In other words, personal income taxes
are so ineffective and tax evasion is so widespread that the welfare effect of a reduction in these
taxes is negligible.
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 Austria and Germany recently introduced energy taxes but these are not based on carbon content.
34
 Since the amount of tax being considered is small the authors believe that a partial equilibrium approach is
reasonable, unlike taxes of $100/ton or higher that are frequently discussed in global models.
35
 The other countries were USA, Japan, Indonesia and Pakistan.
36
 This increase is incidentally the highest among all the countries studied. In fact, these results “lend support to the
widely-supported view that corporate income taxes are far more distortionary than labor income taxes.” (op. cit.,
p. 19).
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Any discussion of a carbon tax in the Indian context must also bear in mind subsidies that
already exist on fossil fuels. In fact, as mentioned above a large proportion of the carbon tax
would go towards neutralising these subsidies. For instance, the price of coal in India was only
85% of long run marginal cost (LRMC) in 1990 (Bates and Moore, 1991), implying a subsidy of
15%. Thus, a carbon tax of $10/ton would lead to an approximately 26% increase in coal prices
in 1987 (the reference year). Thus, to the extent that a carbon tax eliminates these subsidies it
should be considered a welfare gain.
In light of this result, S-L re-examine the welfare cost of a revenue neutral switch from a
personal income tax to a $10/ton carbon tax. The difference as compared to the earlier case is
that now a welfare gain of $33.8 million (from removing the subsidy on coal through a carbon
tax) is explicitly included in the calculations.37 This gain is exactly offset by a welfare loss of
$33.9 million due to the carbon tax on petroleum products.38 In sum, the efficiency cost of a
revenue neutral switch to a carbon tax is zero, provided welfare gains from removal of other
price distortions are accounted for.
Last but not least, in addition to abating emissions of greenhouse gases (GHGs), a carbon tax
could also result in reduced emissions of local and regional pollutants such as oxides of sulphur
and nitrogen, carbon monoxide, and particulates (SO2, NOx, CO, and PM, respectively). This is
due to its effect on the level and composition of fossil fuel use. In other words, such a tax would
not only address a global externality, but also help in addressing regional and local
environmental problems. Since coal is the predominant fossil fuel consumed in India, emission
reductions due to a carbon tax would be the highest here (compared to other countries).
Comparing the welfare cost ($130 million) of a $10/ton carbon tax (no change in existing taxes)
with various estimates of benefits of a reduction in SO2, NOx and PM emissions, the benefit-cost
ratio ranges from 1.9 to 9.5 (S-L, op. cit., Table 4.1).39
A more recent study by Bussolo and O’Connor (2001) uses a CGE model to specifically
examine the ancillary benefits of limiting CO2 emissions for India. Ancillary benefits are defined
in terms of reduced mortality and morbidity due to reduced particulate concentrations and are
estimated at 334 lives saved per million tonnes of carbon abated (or $58/ton of carbon emissions
reduced in monetary terms). These benefits are juxtaposed against the welfare costs of CO2
abatement through a tax to arrive at the level of “no regrets” abatement (the level of abatement
where ancillary benefits are at least as much as the cost of abatement). This level ranges from
13-23% of baseline CO2 emissions in the year 2010 (depending on the values of statistical life
and substitution elasticities used in the analysis). In other words, just on the strength of ancillary
benefits CO2 emissions could be reduced by at least 12-13% over the baseline in the year 2010
without any net cost.
Unlike the partial equilibrium approach and small levels of carbon tax in the S-L study cited
above, a more recent exercise by Fisher-Vanden et al. 1997) uses a multi-sector computable
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 In these calculations interfuel substitution is ignored as in previous cases, thus under/over stating the true welfare
gain/loss.
38
 The authors do not consider the removal of subsidy in the price of petroleum products in this simulation.
39
 The wide range for this ratio is due to the uncertainty/imprecision in arriving at a monetary value of the benefits
of emission reductions. The main monetary benefits come from improved health and reduced corrosion but the
estimates are “likely to be crude at best” (op. cit., p. 23).
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general equilibrium model for India to examine the impact of rather large carbon taxes on carbon
emissions. Three scenarios are analysed over the modelling horizon (1990-2030), namely,
varying carbon taxes to ensure stabilization of carbon emissions at 1990 levels in each time
period (the so called 1X case), at most a doubling of carbon emissions in each period (the 2X
case), and at most a tripling of carbon emissions in each period (the 3X case). In the 1X case,
carbon taxes start at $40 per ton of carbon (TC) and go up to $1100/TC in the year 2030.40 The
corresponding figures for the year 2030 are $162/ton and $25/ton in the 2X and 3X case,
respectively. Though the revenue received from these taxes is recycled back to households as
additions to personal income, there is a fall in GDP and consumption—in the 1X scenario for
instance GDP and consumption in 2030 decline by 6.3% and 14.6 %, respectively. These taxes
also imply a significant increase in fuel prices—a $100/ton carbon tax would translate into an
increase of 98% in crude oil prices and 276% in coal prices over 1985 levels (op. cit., Table 11).
What this analysis suggests is that a national carbon tax large enough to stabilize carbon
emissions would be costly for India.41 Thus, it may be desirable to couple a stabilization target
with global emissions trading where permit allocations are either grandfathered (at 1990 levels of
carbon emissions) or decided on a per capita basis. In the former case, due to rapid future
economic growth India would be a net buyer of permits. But on the whole this approach would
still be less expensive ($50 billion in 2030) than domestic abatement through a national carbon
tax ($72 billion in 2030). With a per capita allocation, however, India would be a net seller of
permits and would have a net gain of $57 billion in 2030. Thus, an allocation of permits in
between these two cases would make India indifferent to participation in a global carbon
stabilization agreement.
5. PROBLEMS IN IMPLEMENTING MBIS IN INDIA AND POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS
The preceding discussion indicates that, the vexatious problem of carving up the global
commons aside, incentive-based policies are beneficial both for India and for developed
countries. In the Indian context, these policies include not only emissions trading but also
carbon taxes and other economic policy reforms. It should not, however, be presumed that
implementation of MBIs by India is an easy task. To begin with, the framework for
environmental regulation in India is predominantly command and control (CAC). There is a
reluctance to consider MBIs even for local environmental issues such as vehicular or industrial
pollution. No matter how compelling the case for MBIs, and notwithstanding the mounting
evidence of their use globally, their implementation is far from certain in India. In the ultimate
analysis MBIs for GHG abatement cannot be viewed in isolation from an overall incentive-based
orientation towards environmental policy as well as broader economic and legal reform that
creates a suitable milieu for MBIs. The following discussion applies to MBIs in general and not
specifically to those targeted at GHG abatement.
Given the growing number of MBIs that are being used by countries around the world, the
question is whether India is so different that none of the country experiences can be replicated
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 All figures are in 1985 dollars.
41
 Unlike S-L or Bussolo and O’Connor this study does not consider the additional benefits of reduced emissions of
local and regional pollutants.
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here. And if so, what are these differences? In this context, note in particular the experience of
China, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and other developing countries including the formerly
planned economies of Europe. Many of these countries have (or had until recently), problems
similar to those that are cited in the Indian context against the use of MBIs: imperfectly
functioning markets, problems of monitoring and enforcing standards (due to a bloated and
inefficient bureaucracy, shortage of resources, large number of micro and small-scale firms),
and so on. While these difficulties are real and cannot be ignored, it is also true that the Indian
situation is amenable to the implementation of well designed MBIs.
The implementation of MBIs has certain prerequisites like well-functioning markets,
information on the types of abatement technology available and its cost (O’Connor 1995,
p. 23-24). In addition, the collection of an emissions charge depends on a reasonably effective
tax administration and monitoring of actual emissions. Tradable permit schemes require an
administrative machinery for issuing permits, tracking trades, and monitoring the actual
emissions. Since the development of these capabilities is crucial for the effectiveness of the
instruments, MBIs cannot be considered as a short cut to pollution control. In other words, MBIs
have institutional requirements just like regulatory measures.
It is important therefore, to examine potential problems in using MBIs in India and how they
could be addressed. To begin with, I focus specifically on issues of monitoring and enforcement.
I then examine barriers to implementation of MBIs in India more generally and classify these
barriers into three groups. It is important to keep in mind that some barriers particularly
institutional and organizational, are not unique to MBIs and apply equally to a CAC regime.
I also suggest possible solutions to problems in implementing MBIs. Finally, I address concerns
of equity vis-à-vis MBIs.
5.1 Monitoring of Discharges: Conceptual Issues and Suggestions
Moving from a CAC regime to MBIs implies that attention has to be paid to the problem of
monitoring emissions. For MBIs such as tradable permits to work well, the credibility of the
system is important. If holders of permits cheat (by discharging more than their permits allow
them to, and/or sell their permits and still continue to emit), then the confidence of players in
the permit market will be undermined. Further, it is argued that since the effectiveness of MBIs
depends crucially on the ability to successfully monitor discharges, till such time as the
capability to monitor plant-level emissions/effluents is in place in India, it is not feasible to
introduce MBIs. In response, it can be argued:
• Monitoring of discharges is also required under a properly functioning command and
control regime. The emphasis on the phrase “properly functioning” is deliberate: the
current practice of merely confirming that pollution abatement equipment is installed
and working is not enough.42 This “checklist” approach to ensuring compliance does not
provide much information about actual emissions/effluents. Therefore, monitoring of
discharges is not a problem unique to MBIs.
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 In some cases, all that is required is that pollution abatement equipment is installed, not even whether it is
operating properly. This is particularly true when courts are deciding whether to shut down polluting units.
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In cases where direct monitoring of discharges is not possible (or is expensive), both theory
and practice suggest several “second best” alternatives. To begin with, there are a number of
ways to indirectly estimate these discharges. For instance:
• Data on inputs and/or output can be used to estimate emissions/effluents as long as the
production function relationship between these variables is known. All that is required
to implement these methods is detailed data on output in physical units or in monetary
values. Of course, the more disaggregated the data, the more fine-tuned are the pollution
coefficients, and the more accurate are the estimates of pollution.
• The example of Sweden shows that it is possible to promote a system of self-monitoring
among large firms. In this case standard emission rates were used for determining NOx
charges for firms whenever emissions were not measurable. These rates were greater
than the average actual emissions, and consequently encouraged the installation of
measurement equipment by firms (OECD, 1994, p. 59). This could be a feasible
monitoring mechanism for large plants in India.
If it is not possible at all to estimate emissions/effluents (even indirectly), the following
options are still available to regulators:
• They could use indirect instruments aimed at the outputs and inputs of the polluting
industry or substitutes and complements to its outputs. For example, a tax on leather
products would be an indirect method of addressing pollution from tanneries. These
indirect instruments should be fine tuned to the extent possible, based on the pollution
potential of different products/processes. For instance, a presumptive emissions tax on
fuels should be differentiated by the emissions coefficients in different industries—thus,
the cement industry which does not discharge the sulfur of its fuels, should ideally be
refunded presumptive sulfur taxes on fuels (Eskeland and Jimenez, 1992).
• If emissions are fully determined by the consumption of one good, then that good can be
taxed (e.g., carbon taxes based on the carbon content of fuels). By the same token,
substitutes to the polluting good should be subsidized (e.g., mass transit if private
vehicles are a cause of urban air pollution), and complements to the polluting good
should be taxed (such as parking space).
Finally, in the context of GHGs particularly CO2, it should be noted that monitoring of
emissions is intrinsically easier—consumption of fossil fuels (and their carbon content) such as
coal, oil and gas should be easily verifiable at an aggregate level
5.2 Monitoring and Enforcement Regime in India: Stylized Facts and Directions for Reform
Specific suggestions are offered below for modifying the current monitoring and enforcement
regime. Again, these observations are made in the context of pollution in general and not GHGs
in particular.
• While emission standards are set at the central level the responsibility for monitoring and
enforcement rests with state pollution control boards (SPCBs).
• There is too much reliance on “pseudo-monitoring and enforcement,” namely, verifying
that pollution control devices are installed (also known as initial compliance), rather
than on monitoring actual discharges (i.e., continuing compliance).
19
• For firms, the probability of being monitored is low. The same is true for enforcement.
This is not only due to a shortage of resources and underfunding of SPCBs, but also due
to the manner in which the Acts have been framed (see next point).
• The monitoring procedures are cumbersome. There is no provision for on-the-spot or
remote monitoring. Samples have to be physically collected and sent to approved
laboratories for analysis. In order for these samples to be used as admissible evidence in
a legal case, elaborate procedures have to be followed. Thus, there is excessive burden
of proof on the SPCB to prove that a violation has occurred. This reduces the expected
penalty and weakens enforcement.
The following recommendations on changing the current monitoring and enforcement rules
and practices are made with a view to introducing MBIs such as emissions trading. These
recommendations, however, would also make the current CAC regime more effective:
• The definition of monitoring and enforcement should be changed from the static one used
at present to a dynamic one that emphasizes emissions discharged per unit of time. This
implies that in addition to monitoring the ability to meet discharge standards, attention
should also be given to frequent measurement of actual performance.43
• The monitoring capabilities of SPCBs should be strengthened. Pecuniary incentives could
be offered to SPCB staff such as rewards for detecting violations that ultimately result
in conviction.
• The laws should be amended to allow on-the-spot measurement of pollution parameters
where technically feasible, with portable monitoring equipment for quick detection of
violations. The Acts should also be amended (particularly the Air Act), to allow the use
of remote monitoring as admissible evidence where technically feasible.
• Self reporting of discharges by firms should be encouraged.44 To this end, the
Environmental Statement (an annual report required from firms on their environmental
performance) should be implemented in a mandatory manner. In fact, this statement
should be a part of the company’s Annual Report, and the Companies Act should be
appropriately modified to reflect this. If firms do not submit these statements, a
presumptive value could be used for the amount of pollution generated by them.45
The role of NGOs and other independent groups in assisting self-reporting by firms
should be examined.
• Regular monitoring of discharges by firms is essential. Often, however, due to paucity of
resources random monitoring may be required. In this context, to use the resources
available for monitoring and enforcement efficiently, it could be announced that firms
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 This distinction was made 16 years ago by Russell et al. (1986) in their seminal study on enforcing pollution laws
in the United States.
44
 Even in developed countries such as the United States with extensive monitoring of point sources self reporting is
widely used.
45
 One method would be to assume that the pollution intensity (i.e., pollution per unit output) of non-reporting firms,
was equivalent to the highest decile of pollution intensity for firms in the same industry using similar processes.
This figure could then be multiplied by the actual output of the non-reporting firm to arrive at a presumptive
value of the amount of pollution generated by it.
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detected violating the rules46 would be placed on a special list and put on probation for a
specified period. During this period they would be subject to a higher than average
frequency of inspection.47 If they followed the rules during this period they would be
removed from the list. However, if they violated the rules during this period they would
be treated as habitual offenders and action would be taken against them.
I now turn to barriers to implementation of MBIs more generally and also propose possible
solutions. The barriers are grouped into three categories as described below:
5.3 Policy Barriers
These mostly pertain to shortcomings in the current environmental policy framework that
potentially hinder the introduction of MBIs:
(i) The biggest policy barrier is inadequate understanding of MBIs among all stakeholders
(industry, NGOs, government and the general public). This results in a number of
misconceptions about MBIs, not only among the general public and NGOs, but among
industry and policymakers as well. While there are a number of legitimate concerns
about MBIs such as the problem of thin markets,48 it is not true that MBIs are a “license
to pollute” as is often argued. A better understanding of what MBIs can and cannot do
and their actual track record in other countries (particularly developing countries), is
vital for their general acceptability.
(ii) More generally, market-based approaches are part of an overall economic approach to
environmental problems. While regulatory agencies and industry in India have a
number of competent technical staff such as environmental scientists and engineers,
there is a paucity of economists working on environmental issues.
(iii) There is an interest among stakeholders in favour of status quo. Many industries favor
fine tuning of the current environmental policy regime rather than a major paradigm
shift entailed by MBIs. For example, firms that have invested heavily in pollution
abatement equipment do not stand to gain much out of differential abatement implicit in
MBIs.49 Firms that are still in the rent-seeking mindset of the ‘license-permit raj’ are
more comfortable with a CAC regime where they can lobby regulators than with a
market-based regime where they have to operate in a competitive market. Similarly,
                                                 
46
 Under MBIs, violation of rules by a firm would include, inter alia, discharges in excess of levels allowed by
permits held by the firm, non-payment of effluent taxes, non-reporting/under-reporting of discharges, etc.
47
 In other words, once a firm is caught a history is created and increases its chances of being caught again.
48
 More generally, advantages of permits may not be fully realised if market imperfections prevent the permit market
from functioning smoothly. For example, if the flow of information is imperfect, potential buyers and sellers of
permits will not be able to engage in profitable trades. In the presence of this and other distortions in the permit
market (e.g., large search costs, strategic behaviour on part of the players), an emission tax system may be
preferred. Further, in the United States it has been noted that much of the permit trading involves large
corporations, perhaps since it is only feasible for larger firms to absorb the high transaction costs without
jeopardising the gains from trade (Tietenberg, 1991, p. 105). Also, with large transaction costs, the final
equilibrium allocation of permits, and hence the aggregate costs of control, also become sensitive to the initial
permit allocation (Hahn and Stavins, 1992, p. 466).
49
 Under differential abatement firms can reduce/abate pollution by varying amounts depending on their costs of
pollution abatement. In other words, high cost firms may prefer to abate less and pay the pollution charges or
buy permits, whereas low cost firms would do just the opposite. By contrast, in a CAC regime all firms have to
abate pollution uniformly.
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bureaucrat-dominated regulatory agencies in India are more comfortable with CAC and
suspicious of markets. In short, it is not apparent that there is a serious commitment to
MBIs among stakeholders.
(iv) In addition to a bias towards direct regulation, environmental agencies such as the
central environment ministry, the pollution control boards and state environment
departments lack policy analysis capabilities. This makes it difficult for them to take
a holistic and long-term view of environmental issues whether they be trade and
environment, transboundary environmental problems, or MBIs. Most agencies are too
caught up in day-to-day administration, public interest litigation and answering
legislative questions. Due to these short-term pressures they are unable to focus on
‘big picture’ issues, and even if they would like to they lack the capability to do so.
(v) A major legal barrier is that enabling changes are required in current legislation to
allow differential abatement entailed by MBIs. Since the CAC regime is enshrined in
the current legislation new legislation to supersede/modify existing laws may be
required. For example, Schedules I, II, and VI of the Environment (Protection) Rules,
1986 specify environmental standards for various air and water pollutants such as
particulates and BOD. Thus, a tax on emissions where firms had the option of paying
the tax rather than abating would violate these rules.
5.4 Institutional and Organizational Barriers
Broadly speaking, the issue here is of governance that is a major barrier to successful
implementation of MBIs. Good governance, however, is required not for MBIs alone but for any
regulatory regime. One aspect of governance not mentioned below but which is a constant
backdrop is corruption. Bribing of regulators at various stages of monitoring and enforcement
can render MBIs ineffective. Again, this problem is not unique to MBIs:
(i) In particular, state pollution control boards (SPCBs) are not autonomous of the state
government in their staffing and day-to-day functioning. This limits their effectiveness.
Moreover, non-specialists who may be unfamiliar with the complexities of
environmental management often manage these boards.
(ii) Monitoring and enforcement are areas where institutional deficiencies could be critical
with respect to the use of MBIs in India. As stated earlier, however, it is incorrect to
argue that MBIs require more intensive monitoring and enforcement as compared to
command and control (CAC). A well functioning CAC requires as much monitoring
and enforcement as MBIs.
5.5 Political and Cultural Barriers
These are largely problems of political economy that militate against MBIs:
(i) Recent reforms notwithstanding, India has a tradition of direct state intervention in
various spheres of the economy and society. For a number of historical and other
reasons Indian policymakers and intelligentsia have viewed markets with suspicion.
This is also true in the context of environmental policies. Given this mindset it is not
surprising that traditional CAC approaches have been relied on so far.
(ii) In addition to regulatory agencies, politicians too would lose discretion and influence
under a market-based regime and are therefore reluctant to embrace it.
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(iii) Government agencies typically do not have a tradition of openness and public
participation. This could be a problem for MBIs, particularly when they are being
phased-in and when dialog and discussion are required.
(iv) India is a pluralistic society where interest groups (industry, labour, farmers, etc.)
jostle to extract concessions from the state. Further, a sense of being entitled to a free
lunch is ingrained among various interest groups. Both of these features result in a
reluctance to pay for services be it higher education or a clean environment. Thus, there
is resistance to pay for the ‘use’ of water or air as would be the case under MBIs.
5.6 Possible Solutions
These range from specific measures to broad policies and are not listed in any particular order
below:
(i) It is necessary to strengthen the knowledge base for MBIs. Information on best practices
vis-à-vis MBIs around the world could be compiled and analyzed for possible lessons
for (and application to) India. This information should be regularly updated since the
application of MBIs around the world is increasing rapidly.
(ii) Maintaining (and perhaps even accelerating) the deregulation and opening of India’s
economy would help in the adoption of MBIs. A more market-oriented mindset on part
of Indian industry would also help in acceptance of MBIs. Similarly, pressure to reduce
the fiscal deficit by reducing government expenditure should result in downsizing of
government. In the overall context of deregulation, there should be a review of
environmental functions the government could withdraw from—a knee-jerk response
of trying to solve environmental problems by enacting laws and regulations should be
avoided.
(iii) Resources such as water should be rationally priced to discourage dilution. Since
water is a state subject this will require consensus building among the states.
(iv) There should be a comprehensive overhaul of the functioning of SPCBs and they
should be made autonomous of state governments. It should also be ensured that
environmental professionals rather than generalists manage these agencies. While some
boards face resource constraints lack of autonomy is a greater problem.
(v) Existing environmental laws should be amended and/or new ones enacted to empower
central/state governments to prescribe MBIs. Before this can happen, however, it will
be necessary to convince the political establishment at the highest levels about MBIs.
(vi) A key requirement for bringing about greater transparency and accountability (which
are critical for effective functioning of MBIs) is right to information. It is necessary to
integrate something like the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) in the United States
into environmental laws and to implement it seriously.
5.7 Distributional Consequences of Market-based Instruments
As is the case with CAC policies, the benefits and costs of MBIs will vary by income class
and by region. Here I briefly touch upon the distribution of the costs of environmental policies in
general, and MBIs in particular. Most empirical studies on the distribution of pollution control
costs have been in the context of existing environmental policies that are largely CAC in nature.
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Thus, studies in the US during the 1970s-80s show that abatement costs were shifted by industry
to consumers through higher prices, and these in turn reduced the real incomes of various income
classes differently.50 Typically, the incidence of these costs was regressive. While these studies
do not directly examine the distributional effects of MBIs, per se, it seems likely that these
effects could be regressive as well (perhaps less so since total costs of abatement would be
lower) since the same dirty industries would have to undertake the bulk of pollution abatement
under both regimes.
Such undesirable distributional effects of the costs of environmental policies, however, can be
corrected through other accompanying measures. For example, pollution taxes could be applied
together with reductions in other distortionary taxes as discussed earlier. Transitional reallocation
problems (such as output and job losses due to higher costs in polluting industries), will arise
when the economy is moving towards a more environmentally-friendly production and
consumption structure. These problems should be addressed by targeted programs of assistance
rather than by a general dilution of environmental goals.
Since the main objective of MBIs (and environmental policy in general), is efficient allocation
of resources they are not very well suited for redistribution objectives. To quote a leading
environmental economist, “it is important to remember that the basic objectives of taxes on
pollution (or other environmental programs) are allocative in nature; their purpose is to achieve
important targets for environmental quality. ..... Where their adverse redistributional impact can
be easily addressed, it is surely important to do so, but environmental measures should not, in
general, be side-tracked on redistributional grounds” (Oates, 1994, p. 129).
6. CONCLUSIONS
Incentive-based approaches for mitigating GHG emissions in India cannot be viewed in
isolation from a broader commitment to MBIs to address environmental problems. Despite
national and international mandates there are a number of obstacles to implementing MBIs in
India. It is possible, however, to address these problems and to articulate broad principles for
using MBIs. In general, incentive-based policies (IBPs) are more flexible than command and
control regulation and are also more cost-effective. Thus, IBPs can help growth and/or free up
resources that could address distributional concerns.
In the specific context of GHG emissions there is considerable scope for using incentive-
based polices in the short and long-run. There is some uncertainty as to how the gains from trade
under CDM would be divided between the North and the South and also about the demand for
CDM projects in the short-term. It is therefore desirable for India to engage in emissions trading
coupled with other incentive-based economy-wide/sectoral policies such as carbon taxes and
energy price reforms. It is unlikely, however, that entitlements purely on the basis of a per capita
criterion will be internationally acceptable, particularly since this would give India entitlements
much in excess of its actual emissions. Some compromise on this issue is therefore inevitable in
the long-run.
                                                 
50
 See Cropper and Oates (1992, pp. 727-728) for highlights of some of these studies.
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